SALISH

All piping, valves, and fittings shall meet the applicable requirements of subchapter F (Marine Engineering). Pinhole leak in overboard piping of #2 fire pump patched with suitable temporary repair. Submit repair plan and crop and renew section of pipe as permanent repair.

THE MINIMUM INSTRUMENTATION, ALARMS AND SAFETY CONTROLS ARE LISTED IN TABLE 62.35-50. VESSEL HAS REQUESTED TO OPERATE WITHOUT THE REQUIRED AUTOMATIC ENGINE SHUTDOWN FOR LOW LUBE OIL PRESSURE ON A LOCAL ROUTE (FAUNTLEROY, VASHON, SOUTHWORTH) THAT IS NOT AUTHORIZED ON ITS COI. VESSEL IS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE APPROPRIATE LOW LUBE OIL PRESSURE ENGINE SHUTDOWN OR PROVIDE A COMPLIANCE DEVIATION PROPOSAL WITHIN 60 DAYS TO THE OCMI FOR CONSIDERATION. -46 CFR 62.35-50

Pipe, tubing, pipe joining fittings, and piping system components, shall meet material and standard requirements of subpart 56.60 and shall meet the certification requirements of part 50 of this subchapter. Vessel has 02 pin hole leaks in the stern tube cooling water piping in the #2 end tank room. 705 c. Vessel to repair/replace all sections of piping with pinhole leaks upon repositioning from Eagle Harbor to Pt. Defiance/Vashon, or within 30 days. 46CFR56.10-1

NO REPAIRS OR ALTERATIONS AFFECTING THE SAFETY OF THE VESSEL SHALL BE MADE WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OFFICER IN CHARGE, MARINE INSPECTION. VESSEL EXPERIENCED A FAILURE OF ITS NO. 1 SHAFT SEAL. VESSEL IS RESTRICTED FROM CARRYING PASSENGERS UNTIL ISSUE HAS BEEN RECTIFIED TO THE SATISFACTION OF USCG. -46 CFR 71.55-1; 701C

THE MINIMUM INSTRUMENTATION, ALARMS AND SAFETY CONTROLS ARE LISTED IN TABLE 62.35-50. VESSEL HAS REQUESTED TO OPERATE WITHOUT THE REQUIRED AUTOMATIC ENGINE SHUTDOWN FOR LOW LUBE OIL PRESSURE ON A LOCAL ROUTE (FAUNTLEROY, VASHON, SOUTHWORTH) THAT IS NOT AUTHORIZED ON ITS COI. VESSEL IS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE APPROPRIATE LOW LUBE OIL PRESSURE ENGINE SHUTDOWN OR PROVIDE A COMPLIANCE DEVIATION PROPOSAL WITHIN 60 DAYS TO THE OCMI FOR CONSIDERATION. -46 CFR 62.35-50

Alcohol test strips on board were recently expired. Rectify prior to getting underway beyond within 2 hours transit of designated testing facility

Prove proper operation of the #1SSDG J/W Pressure gauge.

Update DVTP's for SSS and ES and prove proper operation of SG3, 12, 16, 18, SP 7, 8, SSES 3, 5, 8, 9, EGES 5, 12, 14

Complete Satisfactory Hydro test on #1 thermal fluid heater.

Install electrical isolation mat infront of E-Gen switch board.

Install break rods in all missing fire pull stations.

Power operated main and auxiliary steering gear must be of adequate strength for and capable of steering the vessel at maximum ahead service speed. The vessel's number 1 steering ram has been sheered off, rendering the steering gear inoperable. Once repaired, a satisfactory steering test must be completed in the attendance of a Coast Guard marine inspector.

Provide root cause analysis for loss of propulsion on 15Jun and prove proper operation prior to the carriage of passengers. 46 CFR 62.25-1

Vital systems that are automatically or remotely controlled must be provided with an alarm system. Vessel self-reported that Omni-Chief user interface for alarm and monitoring system was not functioning as designed. Vessel must ensure that ECR is continuously manned while additional safety round of machinery space is completed when Omni-Chief user interface is rebooting. Vessel is to notify Sector Puget Sound Duty Marine Inspector of any further malfunctions or developments. 705C , 46 CFR 62.25-1

Submit a qualitative failure analysis to indicate automation assumptions, vessel/equipment, operating conditions, failures considered, cause and effect relationships, method of crew detection of failure and alternatives available to the crew of the ship's service and emergency switching gear. Provide a corrective action for any single point failures (non-concurrent) identified, updated and submit the required plans for approval with in 60 days. Any modifications or equipment replacement needed to effect the corrective actions shall be carried out at the vessel's next dry dock and demonstrated via design verification tests to the satisfaction of the attending Marine Inspector. Dry dock: Chetzemoka - 31Mar2023 Salish - 28Feb2024 Kennewick - 31Mar2025

Hold back devices were observed on the crew stair tower doors in the deck crew accommodations and in the engineering accommodation spaces. Hold back hooks, or other means of permanently holding these doors open, not subject to control station release, are not permitted. Remove installed hold backs from stair tower doors. 46 CFR 72.05-25(b)(9)(ii)

Vessel must have duplicate means of propulsion. #2 main engine is non operational. Complete repairs to #2 main engine

Fire screen door #17 will not close unassisted. Carryout maintenance needed for door to closed unassisted. This door is to remain closed until such time that it can be repaired and fucntions as designed.

#2 Aux heating boiler past due for hydro. Make boiler ready for hydrostatic test.

All doors, except those that are kept normally closed, shall be of a type which are capable of release from the control sation and from a position at the door. The release mechanism shall be designed that the dor will automatically close in the event of disruption of the control system. Fire screen door number 8 did not properly close.

Each space used by passengers or crew must be fitted with lighting that provides for a safet habitable and working environment under normal conditions. Total of 5 lights were out throughout the vessel.

Vessel is required to have 100% lifesaving evenly distributed on each side of the vessel. Vessel reported that one of four IBA's launching equipment was damaged. The vessel shall only carry 50% of the total person capacity at 380 persons including crew.

Provide a contact maker to positively transfer steering control to remedy partial steering transfers between the No. 1 and No.2 pilot house.

M/E #2 loss of primary power audible and visual alarms failed to activate. Automatic transfer to required backup or redundant systems or power sources must be alarmed in the machinery spaces.

Instructions shall be posted in the steering room steps to be taken in changing to the emergency steering. No. 2 end operating instructions in steering gear room illegible.

Valve failure in potable water heating system prevented required hydrostatic testing of vessel auxiliary boilers. Repair or modify system to make ready for hydrostatic testing.

First aid kit has expired items. Renew appropriate items to make ready for immediate use.

Watertight door #4 did not indicate closed position in pilot house during remote test. Remote closure must activate and show whether the door is open or closed.

Each vessel must carry lifebuoys approved under approval series 160.150. Lifebuoys were faded and deteriorated and need to be replaced.

Each fire hydrant must have a at lest one lenth of fire hose, a spanner, and a hose rack or other device for stowning the hose. Fire station 13 hose unservicable and unable to combat fire.

Vessel experienced loss of steering using A system, pumps 1A and 2A. Make necessary repairs to the steering system and prove proper operation. 46 CFR 58.25

Install data logger on propulsion control/steering gear along with steering gear gauges to provide data. 46 CFR 71.25-50

Provide non destructive testing of welds in way of damage from grounding. 46 CFR 72.01-15

Each vessel must have a steering failure alarm that actuates an audible and visible alarm in the pilot house when the actual position of the rudder differs more than 5 degrees from rudder position ordered by the follow up controls. In cruising mode the rudder lever was in the port 10 degrees position and no alarm was activated

Markings in the pilothouse must not interfere with the helmsman's vision, but must be clearly visible at night, does not have illumination to read lever position.

#2 END Rudder is jammed to STBD as a result of a soft grounding. Damage to Rudder post must be repaired and sea trials conducted prior to carrying pax.

WHILE CONDUCTING FIRE DRILL NO CREW MEMBER CLEARED OR SIMULATED CLEARING PASSENGERS FROM THE AFFECTED SPACE AS ASSIGNED BY THE MUSTER LIST. UPON FURTHER REVIEW THE ONLY CREW MEMBER ASSIGNED TO PASSENGER CONTROL STOPPED AT THE FIRE DOOR BECAUSE THE DORRS WERE CLOSED BEFORE THEY GOT ON SCENE TO REMOVE PASSENGERS AND CREW MEMBER DID NOT KNOW TO BREECH THE SMOKE BOUNDARY TO COMPLETE ASSIGNED DUTIES. ALL CREW MEMBERS SHOULD RECEIVE TRAINING ENSURING THAT EMERGENCY POSITIONS ARE KNOWN BEFORE EACH CREW CHANGE. TITLE 46 CFR 199.180(b)(1) REQUIRES THAT EVERY CREW MEMBER WITH EMERGENCY DUTIES ASSIGNED ON THE MUSTER LIST MUST MUST BE FAMILIAR WITH THEIR ASSIGNED DUTIES BEFORE THE VOYAGE BEGINS. A REPORT SHALL BE SUBMITTED WHEN TRAINING IS COMPLETE FOR ALL CREW MEMBERS.

DURING DRILL IT WAS NOTED THAT THE VESSEL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN WAS INEFFECTIVE IN COMMUNICATING EMERGENCY INSTRUCTIONS TO PASSENGERS AS REQUIRED BY 46 CFR 199.80. VESSEL LARGELY RELIES ON SYSTEM OF AMBER BEACONS ACTIVATED BY THE BRIDGE TO INFORM PASSENGERS OF PROPER PATH TO EMERGENCY MUSTER STATIONS, CREW MEMBERS WERE ABSENT DURING DRILL TO PROVIDE DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS. THE LIGHTS DO NOT CLEARLY INDICATE THE SAFE PATH TO THE MUSTER STATION, AS THERE IS LITTLE OR NO EXPLANATORY SIGNAGE ABOARD. AS PER THE MUSTER LIST, THERE IS ONLY ONE MEMBER OF THE CREW ASSIGNED TO CLEAR THE UPPER AND MAIN PASSENGER DECKS OF PASSENGERS IN AN EMERGENCY. THE DESIGNATED CREW MEMBER WAS ABSENT DURING DRILL. VESSEL PLAN MUST BE REVIEWED TO IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS AND ENSURE THAT THERE IS SUFFICENT TRAINED MANPOWER TO EFFECTIVELY GUIDE PASSENGERS AWAY FROM DANGEROUS SITUATIONS AND DIRECT THEM TO MUSTER STATIONS. IMPLEMENTATION AND DEMONSTRATION OF THIS PLAN MUST BE PRESENTED TO THE SATISFACTIONS OF THE [name withheld] 90 DAYS.

Prove proper operation of low water fuel cutoff device on boiler #1 and boiler #2.

Service pressure/temperature gauge on boiler #1 and boiler #2.

Operational deployment of slide #1 and #2 MES is extended until scheduled laid-up period, not to extend beyond 30APR17. 46 CFR 199.190(k)

INSTALL COMPLETE BUT SIMPLE INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATION OF EDG CO2 SYSTEM IN A CONSPICUOUS PLACE AT OR NEAR ALL PULL BOXES, STOP VALVE CONTROLS, AND IN THE CO2 CYLINDER STORAGE ROOM. ALSO INCLUDE A SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF THE SYSTEM AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR DETAILING ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF DISCHARGING THE SYSTEM SHOULD THE MANUAL RELEASE OR STOP CHECK VALVES FAIL TO OPERATE. 46 CFR 76.15-10(h)

INSTALL CONSPICUOUSLY LOCATED KEY, IN GLASS- BREAK- TYPE BOX, NEAR EDG CO2 ROOM SINCE SPACE REMAINS LOCKED. 46 CFR 76.15-10(i)

Remove salt bag broken on deck #2 end. Clean off steel deck. 04AUG

Provide and place onboard copy of NTVRP letter.

Properly repair gasket on weathertight door #2 end port side.

Provide copy of liferaft servicing certificates for IBAs.

Pin discovered broken on #1 end. Replace boken pin.

Radar on #1 end inoperable. 46 CFR 77.09-1

New retro reflective tape on Texas deck life ring buoys where faded. 46 CFR 199.70(a)

Various power supply units for vital system automation are in a ground fault condition. Provide approved plans to OCMI for repair oversight. 46 CFR 62.20

Provide audible and visual EOT power failure alarm in both pilot houses. 46 CFR 113.35-5(e)(2)

#2 end flip rudder neck bearing and bushing show visible signs of accelerated wear causing flip rudder contact main rudder during turns. Provide rudder vendor recommendation for short and long term repairs/monitoring for Coast Guard approval.

#2 End flip rudder neck bearing was found with accelerated wear during UWILD. Make permanent repairs to rudder and bearing.

Crack discovered in steering sleeve of intermediate pipe, oil tube return. Crack was welded and new sleeve placed on order. Make permanent repairs to satisfaction of attending marine inspector.

Properly repair low temperature cylinder on MDE.

Provide proof of liferaft servicing certificates

Prove proper operation of fire screen doors #1,2,6,7,10,15,22,and 24 prior to carrying passengers

[withheld — contains personal information; the deficiency system, dates, and resolution status are shown above]