PACIFIC INFINITY

A ship when in a port of another Contracting Government is subject to control by officers duly uthorized by such a government converning operational requirements in respect to the safety of ships, when there are clear grounds for believing that the master or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the safety of ships. PSCO observed during the 1st attempt at fire drill: fire team member was not able to communicate with fire party leader due to his radio communications falling off during his movement towards the simulated fire. Fire party leader was directly in the vicinity of the fire without proper PPE coaching the fire team during the entire drill. Both fire team members had reduced visibility due to improper donning of the SCBA face mask. One fire team member's visibility was 90% blocked due to the neck flash guard. PSCO observed during the second attempt at fire drill: Again, both fire team members had reduced visibility (fogging) due to improer donning of the SCBA face mask. One fire team member's visibility was 90% blocked due to neck flash guard. Fire team member did not have rigid helmet secured properly. Fire team member's torch was located in his boiler suit under the FF ensemble and he was not able to provide. Member removed gloves to attempt to retrieve flash light but was unsuccessful. PSCO observed during both drills: ventilation was not secured. emergency fire pump was not started. 74 SOLAS (2020) XI-1/4

The company and the ship shall comply with the requirements of the ISM code. The company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new assignments related to the safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarization with their duties. Crew members failed to don the immersion suit completely and within time requirements. Crew members were unaware the immersion suits were to be worn in conjunction with the life jackets. Hydrostatic release unit for the raft was incorrectly installed and crew was not able to identify the issue when PSCO inquired. Crew members failed to properly test the Oily Water Separator given multiple attempts. The sample line valve for the OWS was in the closed position during opertion and the system continuously ran without measuring effluent prior to discharge overboard. Crew stated the sample line valve was open only to take samples. 74 SOLAS IX/3.1 ISM Code 6.3

The master, owner, operator, agent, or person in charge of a vessel equipped with ballast tanks that operate in the U.S. must employ one of the following methods in 33CFR151.2025. Vessel's ballast water treatment system was missing the marking plate with the CG approval number and crew did not have the proper manual indicated in the CG approval certificate. Vessel's ballast water management plan does not indicate any of the other approved methods. Vessel shall not discharge ballast in the U.S. waters.