PIRIKA MOSIRI MARU

A ship in a port of another Contracting Government is subjacted to control by officials duly authorized by such Government concerning operational requirements in respect to the safety of ships, when there are clear grounds for believing that the master or crew are not familiar with essential shipboard procedures relating to the safety of ships. Observations were made during the first attempt of the simulated fire drill at the ship's galley. 1, Fire doors were left in the open position during the event of the fire. 2. Fire party did not use the fire-fighting radio communications as provided. 3. The use of the ship's regular radios were used and crew member removed his fire-fighting gloves to use the radio. Communications from the fire party to the leader of the fire party was unclear to determine. 4. Second fire party member was performing boundary cooling without a complete fire-fighting assemble: missing rigid helment missing fire-fighting gloves and SCBA face mask was not securely fastened subsequently causing fogged vision. During the second attempt of the fire drill, PSCO observed the following: 1. The first fire party member's SCBA face mask was not securely fastened subsequently causing fogged vision. 2. The second fire party, member's SCBA was continuously leaking rapidly depleting the supplied air provided. Tank completely depleted under 10 minutes and before the completion of the drill. 3. Crew members failed to recognize leaking SCBA nor made any rectification before sending fire party to fire location. A third attempt of a fire drill was given at the ship's laundry room. PSCO observed satisfactory fire drill.

The company and ship shall comply with the requirements of the ISM Code. The company should establish procedures, plans and instructions including checklist as appropriate, for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of personnel, ship and protection of the environment, During the operational test of the Oily Water Separator, crew failed to demonsttate the proper function of the system, PSCO noted the flow of sample to the oil content meter while the OWS kept pumping effluent overboard (simulated overboard). In approximately 2 hours, crew was able to create a sample flow from the OCM by throttling the valve positions. Crew had no procedures to determine the position of the manual 2 way valve (simulated overboard line from teh OWS to OCM, and the pressure required to properly operate the system. PSCO witnessed the OWS continuously operate with no effluent passing through the sensor giving a true representative sample of th eeffluent processed overboard thus bypassing the interlock function prevention discharging bilge without sampling the stagnant pressure in the sample line was able to satisfy the pressure controls in the system to allow continous operation.