LIBERTY GLORY

The company and the ship shall comply with the requirements of the International Safety management Code. The company should ensure that each ship is manned with qualified, certificated, and medically-fit seafarers in accordance with national and international requirements and appropriately manned in order to encompass all aspects of maintaining safe operations on board. The company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and personnel transferred to new assignments related to safety and protection of the environment are given proper familiarization with their duties. The company should ensure that all personnel involved in the company’s safety management system have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulations, and guidelines. There was a significant breakdown in the implementation of the ships Safety Management System, as evidenced by deficiencies 02-03. The crew experienced a changeover of approximately 80%, with the new members not receiving the necessary training and familiarization to perform their operational and safety duties. 74 SOLAS 2020 CONS. IX/3.1 ISM CODE 6.2; 6.3; 6.4 46 CFR 15.405

Crew members shall be trained to be familiar with the arrangements of the ship as well as the location and operation of any firefighting systems and appliances that they may be called upon to use. Crew demonstrated a lack of training and familiarity with the arrangements of the ship and the operation of firefighting appliances that they may be called upon to use. Crew members improperly donned firefighter’s outfits and failed to secure the fire hose while performing the fire drill. 74 SOLAS 2020 CONS. II-2/15.2.2.1

Performance of crew members assigned fire-fighting duties shall be periodically evaluated by conducting on board training and drills to identify areas in need of improvement, to ensure competency in firefighting skills is maintained, and to ensure the operational readiness of the firefighting organization. Observed three failed fire drills: first in crew laundry, second in galley, and third in the emergency generator space. Observed unfamiliarity with vessel equipment, vessel layout, and firefighting procedures including closure of fire boundaries, communication, and firefighting PPE use. A satisfactory fire drill shall be observed prior to clearing this deficiency, to the satisfaction of a Coast Guard Marine Inspector. 74 SOLAS 2020 CONS. II-2/16.2.2.3

Before a ship leaves port and at all times during the voyage, all life-saving appliances shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. The forward life raft emergency embarkation ladder shackles for mounting the ship were found seized thus prohibiting the crew from securing the ship during an emergency. 74 SOLAS (2020 Ed.) Ch.III/Reg.20.1

Not less than one half of the total number of lifebuoys shall be provided with lifebuoy self-igniting lights complying with the requirements of paragraph 2.1.2 of the code. 03 lifebuoys lines to attach the self-igniting light to the buoy were found deteriorated and unfit for service. 74 SOLAS (2020 Ed.) Ch.III/Reg.7.1.3

Stairways and lift trunks which penetrate more than a single deck shall be surrounded by at least “A-0” class divisions and be protected by self-closing doors at all levels. MI observed that multiple doors in the main stairway did not self-close. 74 SOLAS (2001 cons.) Ch. II-2/46.1

The means for securing these doors weathertight shall consist of gaskets and clamping devices or other equivalent means and shall be permanently attached to the bulkhead or to the doors themselves. MI observed that the watertight door leading to the bosun storeroom was fitted with soft gasket material that was inappropriate for the intended use. Additionally, MI discovered the gasket material on the #4 cargo hatch and bosun store hatch was worn and needs to be renewed. Watertight doors throughout the vessel require maintenance to the dogs and grease fittings. 66 ICLL (88 Protocol) Regulation 12.1

Each lifeboat shall be provided with an appliance capable of launching and recovering the lifeboat. 74SOLAS(01) III/16.1` Currently, on the Starboard lifeboat, the cable for releasing the davit brake while within the lifeboat is inoperable. The cable jumped off the winch spool and became tangled with numerous kinks. The lifeboat davits were recently serviced in the shipyard and ABS Issued the Cargo Ship Safety Equipment Certificate on 01FEB2021. Prior to departure provide a Class Report attesting to proper operation of both the Port and Starboard lifeboat davits

Due extenuous circumstances the vessel will be allowed to past its annual inspection date.

The fall hooks would not release and allow the vessel to disconnect from the vessel.

Vessel reported via CG-2692 failure of the navigational gyrocompass.