MSC JAPAN

During the abandon ship drill, the port side lifeboat remote braking cable snapped, rendering the lifeboat unusable in an emergency condition.

The Company and the ship shall comply with the requirements of the International Safety Management Code. For the purpose of this regulation, the requirements of the Code shall be treated as mandatory. In meeting these requirements, the Company should ensure that: inspections are held at appropriate intervals; any non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known; appropriate corrective action is taken; and records of these activities are maintained. Objective evidence discovered during an expanded ISM exam revealed the following non-conformities: the crew failed to fully implement the requirements of the ISM code through their SMS procedures. These identified deficiencies are evidence that the ship and/or company are not meeting the SMS requirements. Recommend external audit. During the exam, PSCO requested engineering crew to conduct a test of the engine room bilge alarm system. Vessel’s electrician was tasked by the Chief Engineer to conduct the requested tests. In the presence of the PSCO, the electrician removed the bilge containment gratings in vicinity of the high and low sea chests to access the bilge alarms. The bilge water in each location was found to be so high that it almost reached the bilge deck plate (i.e. at such at a high level that the bilge alarms should have already been activated). PSCO asked the electrician why the audible and visual components of the bilge alarm system weren’t engaging, the electrician stated that he had disconnected the alarms without providing further explanation. The PSCO determined that the consistent ingress of water into this area was attributed to excessive leaking from the general service pump and sea water intake piping. The inoperability of the bilge alarms, deterioration of the general service pump and lack of watertight integrity within the piping system demonstrates neglect of the crew to address these issues in a timely and proper manner. The SMS required weekly and monthly inspections of the E/R to include operation of the bilge alarms. None of the weekly logs indicated any report of the nonconformity of the bilge alarm nor corrective action taken. Additionally, the operational readiness and effectiveness of the CO2 fire suppression system was found to be in non-compliance with the system’s intended design and installation. Two CO2 dispersion nozzles within the overhead of of the main diesel engine was missing (i.e. not installed).Maintenance of the CO2 system was conducted by a third party contractor in May of 2020; therefore the absence of these dispersion nozzles at the time of examination is inexplicable. The engineering department completed weekly and monthly inspection reports (i.e. logs), where the existing non-conformities on the CO2 system were not recorded, reported, or corrected as required by the SMS. This is clear evidence that the ship’s crew was not performing adequate required inspections and/or not submitting notifications to the vessel's classification society.

The piping for the distribution of fire-extinguishing medium shall be arranged and discharge nozzles so positioned that a uniform distribution of medium is obtained. PSCOs discovered 02 fixed carbon dioxide dispersion nozzles missing from piping outside of engine control room. 74SOLAS(97)II-2/5.1.3

Each emergency generating set arranged to be automatically started shall be equipped with starting devises approved by the Administration with a stored energy capability of at least three consecutive starts. A second source of energy shall be provided for an additional three starts within 30 min. PSCOs witnessed crew try to start the emergency generator via hydraulic start for 30 minutes with no start achieved. 74SOLAS(04)II-1/44.2

The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board. PSCOs witnessed 04 soft patches on piping throughout the engine room. 01 on sea water piping along fwd bilge near GS pump, 03 in the overhead outside of the engine control room. SOLAS 74 (88 Protocol) I/11

The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board. The machinery, boilers and other pressure vessels, associated piping systems and fittings shall be of a design and construction adequate for the service for which they are intended and shall be so installed and protected as to reduce to a minimum any danger to persons on board, due regard being paid to moving parts, hot surfaces and other hazards. PSCO observed substantial sea water ingress from one of the vessel’s general service pumps of approximately 1 gallon an hour, lack of machinery guard over impeller shaft, and wasted and missing mounting hardware. 74solas(04)II-1/26.1

The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or person onboard. Bilge alarm system is inoperable (disconnected) and unable to produce audible or visual alarm for water ingress. SOLAS 74 (88 Protocol) I/11