FISHER

The inspection for certification shall include an inspection of the structure, boilers, and other pressure vessels, machinery, and equipment. The inspection shall be such as to insure that the vessel, as regards the structure, boilers and other pressure vessels, and their appurtenances, piping, main and auxiliary machinery, electrical installations, lifesaving appliances, firedetecting and extinguishing equipment, pilot boarding equipment, pollution prevention equipment, and other equipment, is in satisfactory condition and fit for the service for which it is intended. Inspector not limited. (a) Nothing in this subpart shall be construed as limiting the inspector from making such tests or inspections as he or she deems necessary to be assured of the safety and seaworthiness of the vessel. You are required to provide a plan for conducting a "fully functional test" of the vessels dewatering system (including suction and discharge using the vessels installed dewatering pumps). After this plan is approved by the Coast Guard, you are required to perform an operational test of the dewatering system witnessed by ABS and the Coast Guard. This test is to be conducted during the vessel's next drydock or the vessel's next Inspection for Certification (whichever occurs first). *Plan required in 90 days

For the past four years, Coast Guard Inspectors and ABS Surveyors have informed the operators of the FISHER (under MSC and MARAD), of the need to witness operational testing of the lower vehicle/cargo decks dewatering pump and rose box system. Since the vessel's commissioning, the Coast Guard and ABS have no record of ever witnessing an operational test of the dewatering system to ensure the dewatering pumps will pump the lower car/cargo decks in a real downflooding situation. ABS and the Coast Guard brought this to the attention of the operators, so this could be scheduled at the next drydock. Currently the FISHER is in drydock at Vigor Shipayard. However, a test of the dewatering system is not in the vessel's yard package. During the ISM Audit completed on 24 July 2024, a non-conformity (ABS finding no. 1386.0) was issued. The vessel failed to meet the requirements as a result of lack of maintenance of critical equipment, testing of the pumps, no critical spare parts for the pumps, and a lack of operational testing of these pumps. ABS Audit report attached. You are required to provide a plan for conducting a "fully functional test" of the vessels dewatering system (including suction and discharge using the vessels installed dewatering pumps). After this plan is approved by the Coast Guard, you are required to perform an operational test of the dewatering system witnessed by ABS and the Coast Guard. *Note - This appears to be a systemic problem, as there are no Coast Guard records of any BOB HOPE class vessel performing a fully functional dewatering test for ABS or the Coast Guard. If you disagree with this decision you may ask for reconsideration, or appeal this decision in accordance with 46 CFR 1.03-20.

The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements, which may be established by the Company. In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that: appropriate corrective action is taken; and records of these activities are maintained. Evidence: The vessels Computerized Maintenance Management System has 100+ repair items identified by the crew or through required Preventative Maintenance and/or Condition Monitoring Inspections that remain open dating back as far as November 2018. It was noted that a portion of these repair items have been repaired but not closed out in the computerized maintenance system. The remaining aging items have not been repair by the company or the crew. Nature: Computerized Maintenance Management System was not updated upon completion of repair items or repair items were never addressed.

The inspection shall be such as to insure that the vessel, as regards…to lifesaving appliances & fire-detecting and extinguishing equipment… is in satisfactory condition and fit for the service for which it is intended. Due to a reduced crew compliment Firefighting Drills and Abandon Ship drill were not assessed. Prior to getting underway the vessel is required to conduct Drills to the satisfaction of an attending Marine Inspector.

Each vessel must have an illuminated repeater for the gyrocompass required under paragraph (b) that is at the main steering stand. The centerline gyrocompass repeater failed to operate as designed. Until the Vessel proves proper operation to the satisfaction of an attending Marine Inspector, vessel is limited to daylight hours only and a minimum of two mile visibility during transit.

Provide Class Report/approved repair plan for the following items: EOS Clutch control for main engines, EOS control for Ballast water system, proper operation of analog gauges at MCC and proper operation of Bridge Throttles control positions indicators at all operating stations.

Fire-fighter's outfits shall consist of an axe with a handle provided with high-voltage insulation. Fire-fighter's outfits on the vessel did not have personal fire axes

Each generator arranged for parallel operation must have reverse-power or reverse-current trips. While testing the #3 generator (parraleled to #4 generator), the #3 generator did not trip in accordance with testing procedures. Approved testing procedures also did not provide step by step instruction sfor carrying out testing.

Each generator prime mover must have an overspeed device that is independent of the normal operating governor and adjusted so that the speed cannot exceed the maxiumum rated speed by more than 15 percent. While testing the overspeed protection on the #3 generator, the indication panel would indicate an overspeed condition but would not trip off the generator.

Prove the proper operation of the vent fire damper located in the E-Gen space and the bow thruster space. Both are CO2 protected spaces.

Prove proper operation of the fire door 5-17-2. Door does not auto close

Prove the integrity of the heavily scaled deck in the F3 cargo hold under the vent damper 7-63-6.

Provide current international certificates.

The company should identify potential emergency shipboard situations and establish procedures to respond to them. During the fire drill the master did not follow emergency shipboard procedures nor produce them upon request. The Vessel’s SMS stated to use the fixed CO2 system as soon as possible, however the crew intended to fight the fire manually. No checklists or plans for emergency response could be located. Provide emergency shipboard procedures for emergency response.

Repair the starboard bridge wing EOT. Vessel must provide an additional crew member to relay information from the main station to the starbaord bridge wing.

Provide an operable speed and distance measuring device. The installed GPS devices must remain operational.

Replace the non-metallic flexible hose being subject to torsional deflection on the No.2A MDE's fuel system.

Repair the No.2 life boat in way of inoperative kill switch and search light.

Replace the broken light float on the ring buoy that is farthest aft on the stern starboard side.

Attach the painter to the weak link for the most aft Life Raft on the starboard side. Painter was not attached to the weak link and would not float free if needed.

Replace fuse or filament on the navigation stern light, ensure it does not alarm when on the Primary source

Provide Technicians and ABS report regarding the proper operation of the installed Fixed Foam Fire Protection Equipment. Report shall include repair of 02 isolation valves and 02 proportioner valves, operational test, and required level of AFFF in both fwd and aft AFFF supply tanks and required spare AFFF to be carried on board. 46 CFR 76

Received email; USNS FISHER SVDR is inoperable. Vessel is to attain Condition of Class from ABS for inoperable SVDR.

Prove proper operation of gyro compass.

Prove proper operation of #2 compressor.

Prove proper operation on water tight door 4-50-1.

Vsl has limited crew due to readiness status. Conduct crew drill prior to activation.

During anchor drill stbd anchor brake failed.