ZUIDERDAM

The activation of any detector or manually operated call point shall initiate a visual and audible fire signal at the control panel and indicating units. PSCOs observed 05 detectors (127-153, 127-151, inside cabin 1070, and aft mooring port and starboard side) that failed to activate. 74 SOLAS 01 II-2/13.1.4 Code 17

All life-saving appliances and arrangements shall comply with the applicable requirements of the Code. The engine shall be capable of operating for not less than 5 min after starting from cold with the lifeboat out of the water. PSCO observed lifeboat #7 fail to start. 74 SOLAS 20 III/34 LSA Code 4.4.6.3 Code 17

The activation of any detector or manually operated call point shall initiate a visual and audible fire signal at the control panel and indicating units. PSCOs observed 03 manually operated call points (127-147, 127-152, and 101-68) that failed to activate. 74 SOLAS 01 II-2/13.1.4 Code 17

Fire protection systems and fire-fighting systems and appliances shall be maintained ready for use. PSCOs observed a high pressure water mist bulb found with no fluid within the apparatus located in Cold Room #7. 74 SOLAS 20 II-2/14.1.1 Code 17

In passenger ships such units shall give an indication of any fire and its location in any space served by the system and shall be centralized on the navigation bridge or in the main fire control station, which shall be so manned or equipped as to ensure that any alarm from the system is immediately received by a responsible member of the crew. PSCO observed a wire emerging from the ceiling which was found to be a missing smoke detector outside of cabin A074 (medical area). 74 SOLAS 01 II-2/12.1.2.1 Code 17

The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company. PSCOs observed 06 smoke detectors and 03 manual call points that either failed to activate or where outright missing throughout the vessel (see other deficiencies). Vessel recently emerged from drydock and sailed with 1,849 passengers. Internal audit required throughout the ship to verify all manual call points and fire detecting equipment operate. 74 SOLAS 20 IX/3.1 ISM Code A.10.1 Code 16

Fire doors in main vertical zone bulkheads and stairway enclosures shall satisfy the following requirements: The doors shall be self-closing and be capable of closing against an angle of inclination of up to 35 degrees opposing closure. PSCOs observed 03 fire doors that failed to close and latch correctly (locations: FSD 01.5.31, 01.3.42, and 02.1.76). 74 SOLAS 01 II-2/30.4.1 Code 10

A record shall be kept of all incidents connected with the radio communication service which appear to be of importance to safety of life at sea. PSCOs observed that vessel has not logged monthly GMDSS tests since June 2025. 74 SOLAS 20 IV/17 Code 10

Every crew member with assigned emergency duties shall be familiar with these duties before the voyage begins. PSCOs observed that the operator of lifeboat #9 did not know how to put the engine into forward. In addition, serval lifeboats did not know where to find sea sickness medication. 74 SOLAS 20 III/19.2.1 Code 10

Hydrostatic release units, other than disposable hydrostatic release units, shall be serviced at intervals not exceeding 12 months. PSCO observed two of the port forward inflatable life rafts had expired HRUs with an expiration date of 06/2024. Crew replaced both HRUs, and PSCO verified replacements. 74 SOLAS 20 III/20.9

Muster and embarkation stations shall be adequately illuminated by lighting supplied from the emergency source of electrical power required by regulation II-1/42 or II-1/43. Embarkation lighting forward of lifeboat # 1 was inoperable. Crew replaced light and PSCO observed embarkation light was operational thereafter. 74 SOLAS 20 III/11.4

Two means of escape shall be provided from each machinery space. One of the emergency means of escape through the escape door trunk, door # FSD 0D.3.07, was missing the exterior door handle. Crew replaced fire door handle under PSCO observation. 74 SOLAS 01 II-2/28.3.1

Every crew member with assigned emergency duties shall be familiar with these duties before the voyage begins. Several life boat crew members were not familiar with life boat emergency procedures for engine compartment fires during an abandon ship scenario. 74 SOLAS (20) III/19.2.1 50ac

The activation of any detector or manually operated call point shall initiate a visual and audible fire signal at the control panel and indicating units. Manual call point 60 located in main laundry on C-Deck was inoperable. 74 SOLAS (01) II-2/13.1.4 10c

Fire doors in main vertical zone bulkheads and stairway enclosures shall be self-closing. FSD 10.05.05 and 10.05.04 did not self-close when tested. Sequencing bars on both double leaf FSDs impleaded in the closing. 74 SOLAS (01) II-2/30.4.1 10c

Muster and embarkation stations shall be adequately illuminated by lighting supplied from the emergency source of electrical power. 02 embarkation starboard side lights were inoperable. 74 SOLAS (20) III/11.4 10c

Before the ship leaves port and at all times during the voyage, all life-saving appliances shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. All six life boat tenders on board had fuel shut-off valves zip tied in the open position not permitting immadiate closure in the event of an emergency. 74 SOLAS (20) III/11.4 10c

Doors and corridors included in the means of escape shall be sized in the same manner as stairways. Shall not be less than 900 mm in clear with. PSCO observed escape routes at the vessel spa obsturcted by stand alone marketing posters, redering it less than 900 mm in clearance. 74 SOLAS (01) II-2/28.1.5.3 10c

Any required automatic sprinkler, fire dectection and fire alarm system shall be capable of immediate operation at all times and no action by the crew shall be necessary to set it in operation. 02 high fog heads located in the marshaling area main zone 2, A-deck did activate upon testing with heat. 74 SOLAS (01) II-2/12.1.1 10c

The construction of all doors and door frames in "A" class divisions, with the means of securing them when closed, shall provide resistance to fire as well as to the passage of smoke and flame, as far as practicable, equivalent to that of the bulkheads in which the doors are situated. Such doors and door frames shall be constructed of steel or other equivalent material. Doors A.6.02 and 07.5.08 did not close all the way. 71 SOLAS 01 II-2/30.2

Fire doors in main vertical zone bulkheads and stairway enclosures shall satisfy the following requirements: The doors shall be self-closing and shall have an approximately uniform rate of closure of no more than 40 seconds and no less than 10 seconds with the ship in the upright position. Fire screen doors 08.2.52, 08.2.35, 07.5.11, 07.5.08, 09.5.09, 09.5.15, and 09.5.16 close quicker than 10 seconds. 74 SOLAS 01 II-2/30.4.1

The means of escape, including stairways and exits, shall be marked by lighting or photoluminescent strip indicators placed not more than 300mm above the deck at all points of the escape route, including angles and intersections. The marking must enable passengers to identify the routes of escape and readily identify the escape exits. Additionally, escape routes signs and fire equipment location markings shall be of photoluminescent material or marked by lighting. The "A" deck passageway just forward of the A.6.02 door is tearing away from the bulkhead rendering it inoperable. 74 SOLAS 01 II-2/28.1.5.10

During preparation and launching, the survival craft, its launching appliance, and the area of water into which it is to be launched shall be adequately illuminated by lighting supplied from the emergency source of electrical power. The two embarkation lights between lifeboats 3 and 5 on the stbd side were found inoperable. 74 SOLAS 20 III/16.7

Each Lifeboat shall be provided with an appliance capable of launching and recovering the lifeboat. The arm of the launching appliance on lifeboat #6 buckled and suffered damage during testing deeming the appliance inoperable and unable to launch or recover the lifeboat. 74 SOLAS 20 III/16.2

A main source of electrical power of sufficient capacity to supply all those services mentioned in regulation 40.1.1 shall be provided. Emergency lighitng in addition to various lighting fixtures on deck 10 were found inoperable. 74 SOLAS 04 II-1/41

Electrical Installations shall be such that the safety of passengers, crew, and ship from electrical hazards will be ensured. CO2 Room on Deck 10 was found with an unauthorized spliced power supply to a ventilation fan. 74 SOLAS 04 II-1/40.1.3

The activation of any manually activated call point shall initiate a visual and audible fire signal at the control panel and indicating units. Multiple manual call points found inoperable and corrected on the spot. 74 SOLAS 01 II-2/1.

Fire-extinguishing appliances shall be kept in good order and be available for immediate use at all times. Hi-fog back flow preventer valve in the forward sewage room was leaking. SOLAS 01 II-2/21

Electrical installations shall be such that the safety of passengers, crew and ship from electrical hazards will be ensured. Light cover in the aft purifier room was missing. SOLAS 04 II-1/40.3

Muster and embarkation stations shall be adequately illuminated. Port side, aft embarkation light, near lifeboat #16 was extinguished. SOLAS 20 III/11.4

Fire-fighting systems and appliances shall be kept in good working order and readily available for immediate use. Fire hose on the port side, 3rd deck was leaking at the coupling. SOLAS 01 II-2/21

A corridor, lobby, or part of a corridor from which there is only one route of escape shall be prohibited. The fire door leading out to the crew deck in the passageway outside crew cabin R005 Senior Officer is lockable in the direction of escape creating only one means of escape from the corridor. SOLAS 01 II-2/28.1.4

Satisfactory means for safe passage in the form of guard rails shall be provided for the protection of the crew in getting to and from the machinery space. Handrail in engine room as shown to crew found with 1/2" cut out. LOADLINE 25(4)

Fire doors shall be self-closing and time of closure shall be no more than 40 seconds and no less than 10 seconds and capable of release at both sides of the door. Multiple doors found unable to close completely, closing faster than 10 seconds and missing release capability on both sides of the door. Doors: 10.6.03, 10.5.09, 10.3.09, 8.1.41, 8.5.14, OD2.09. SOLAS 01 II-2/30

Electric radiators shall be fixed in position and constructed to reduce fire risk and so that no exposed clothing, curtains or other similar materials can be scorched or set on fire. Wood overhead IVO electric radiator in male sauna found scorched. SOLAS 01 II-2/18.3

Furniture in stairway enclosures shall be limited to seating. Found multiple hand sanitation stations and mask sign structures not permanently mounted within stairway enclosures. SOLAS 01 II-2/41-2/4.10

The means of escape including stairways and exits shall be marked, at all points of the escape route including angles and intersections, by lighting or photoluminescent strip indicators. The category two stairs located by fire door OA.3.5.8 did not have any low location lighting or photoluminescent strips. SOLAS 01 II-2/41-2.4.7

Each lifebuoy shall be marked in block capitals of the roman alphabet with the name and port of registry of the ship. Vessel name and port of registry unreadable on stbd quarter lido deck life ring. SOLAS 20 III/7.1.1.4

The provisions on the prevention of accidents and the protection of health and employment which may be applicable to the work of seafarers, and shall specify measures for the prevention of accidents which are particular to maritime employment. Ruptured drain pipe found leaking into lift machinery room creating a potential electrical hazard for crew due to proximity to switchboard IVO door 10.4.09. ILO 147/PWSA 33USC1223(B)1

The ring, lines and letters shall be painted in white or yellow on a dark background. Deck line found painted same color as hull. LOAD LINE 8

The condition of the ship shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board. Vessel reported suspected breach/hole direct to the sea in the 6 Center ballast water tank. Checks on adjacent tanks and relevant tank tops, valves, and sounding pipes reveal no progressive flooding. Vessel reports no impact to stability. Vessel must to complete the following: 1. Submit causal analysis to Class and USCG. 2. Submit repair plan to Class for approval and USCG for visibility. 74SOLAS(04) 1/11(A)

EACH PERSON WHO HAS NOTICE OF THE TERMS OF AN ORDER ISSUED UNDER THIS SUBPART MUST COMPLY WITH THAT ORDER. THE C/V ZUIDERDAM WAS ISSUED A CG-5437B WITH A DEFICIENCY ON 1/6/2021 CONCERNING A BREACH IN THE 6 CENTER BALLAST TANK. THE ACTION TAKEN FOR THIS DEFICIENCY IS A CODE "17AC", DETAILING THE DEFICIENCY BE RECIFIED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, TO THE SATISFACITON OF THE RO/RS AND THE U.S. COAST GUARD. ON 1/8/2021 AT 2200 HOURS, THE C/V ZUIDERDAM DEPARTED THE PORT OF SAN DIEGO WITHOUT SUBMITTING EVIDENCE TO THE U.S. COAST GUARD RECTIFYING THE DEFICIENCY NOTED ON THE CG-5437B.

WITH THE PERMETER OF SUCH STAIRWAYS ENCLOSURES. ONLY PUBLIC TOILETS, LOCKERS OF NON-COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL PROVIDING STORAGE FOR SAFETY EQUIPMENT. ARE PERMITTED. IN DECK 1 AFT CREW STAIRCASE HAD STORAGE OF PORTIBLE EXTINGUISHERS NOT IN A LOCKER. 74 SOLAS 2001 CONS. II-2/29.2 16AC

FIRE DOORS IN MAIN VERTICAL ZONE BOUNDAIES SHALL BE SELF CLOSING AND BE CAPABLE OF CLOSING AGAINST AN ANGLE OF INCLINATION OF UP TO 3.5 DEGRESS OPOSING CLOSRE MULTIPLE "A" CLASS FIRE DOORS DID NOT CLOSE COMPLETELY UPON OPERATION. 74 SOLAS 2001 CONS II-2/30.4 10C

THE CONSTUCTION OF ALL DOORS AND DOOR FRAMES SHALL PROVIDE RESISTANCE TO FIRE AS WELL AS TO THE PASSAGE OF SMOKE AND FLAME. FSD 09.3.52 HAS EXCESSIVE WASTAGE AT THE BASE OF THE DOOR. 74 SOLAS 2001 CONS. II-2/30.2 16AC

THE MEANS OF ESCAPE SHALL BE MARKED BY LIGHTING OR PHOTOLUMINESCENT STRIP INDICATORS PLACE NOT MORE THAN 0.3M ABOVE THE DECK AT ALL POINTS OF THE ESCAPE ROUTE. LANDING ON DECK A AFT CREW STAIRCASE DID NOT HAVE LOW LOCATION LIGHTING OR PHOTO LUMINESCENT STRIP ON AN EGRESS ROUTE. 74 SOLAS 2001 CONS II-2/28.1.10 10C

Where the emergency source of power is a generator, it shall be... started automatically upon failure of electrical power and shall be automatically connected to the emergency switchboard. The vessels emergency diesel generator is unable to automatically connect to the emergency switchboard. 74 SOLAS (2004 CONS) II 42.3.1.2

Every steam pipe and every fitting connected thereto through which steam may pass shall be installed as to withstand the maximum working steam pressure. Lower pressure steam line has pinhole leak on weld. 40 ac, 74 SOLAS (04) II-1/33.1

Each Survival craft shall be stowed in a state of continuous readiness. Lifeboat #7 was not able to clutch ahead or astern. 74 SOLAS (14 Cons.) Ch. III/13.13 16ac

The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulation. Lifeboat #1 primary steering is inoperable. 74 SOLAS (14 Cons) Ch. I/11(a)

"A" class divisions shall be constructed as to be capable of preventing the passage of smoke and flame. Door located on the 7th Deck aft (07.04.15) is bowed in the upper part preventing a proper seal. 74 SOLAS (01 Cons) Ch. II-2/3.3

"B" Class Division are those division that shall be capable of preventing the passage of flame to the end of the first half hour. "B" Class door located across from cabin 077901 is bowed on the bottom part of the door preventing a proper seal. 74 SOLAS (01 Cons) Ch.II-2/4.1

0915 - Safety in general - Escape route signs and fire equipment location markings shall be of photoluminescent material in accordance with the FSS Code. Multiple photoluminescent material marking locations and equipment throughout the ship did not work, to include means of escape signs, SART locations, EEBD locations. - 74SOLAS(2001 cons.)II-2/13.3.2.5.1 - 50a

74 SOLAS (2001) II-2/28.1 - MSC SOLAS 25 - As per MSC guidelines SOLAS-25 there is a room-in-room configuration located on deck 9 Spa Office. Spa office is not given an immediate and clear notification of a fire in surrounding space before smoke and fire reach a level that will prevent safe passage.

74 SOLAS (2014) III/34, LSA Code IV/4.4.7.4 - Lifeboats shall have suitable handholds on the underside of the hull to enable persons to cling to the lifeboat. Port side lifeboat number four has a bent and corroded handhold on the underside of the hull, rendering it unsafe for persons to cling to if capsized.

0720 - For passenger ships over 1,000 GT, at least one effective jet of water is immediately available from any hydrant in an interior location. The hydrant in the aft engine room is inoperable. 74 SOLAS (01), Ch. II-2 / Reg. 4.3.4.

0700 Where the contents and use of a space are such that there is a doubt as to its classification for the purpose of this regulation, it shall be treated as a space with the relevant category having the most stringent boundary requirements. Aft engineering workshop contains flammable storage locker with no procedures for storage; excessive flammable storage. 74 SOLAS (01), Ch. II-2 / Reg. 26.2.2.

Fire doors in main vertical zone bulkheads, galley, boundaries, shall be self-closing. The following fire screen doors were found inoperable: FSD 0D.4.06, FSD 06.5.08, Lido deck starboard rolling fire screen door. 74SOLAS(01 Cons) II-2/30.4.2

Escape routes shall be maintained in a safe condition, clear of obstacles. The escape route leading from the purser's office located on deck1 had a desk limiting the width of the escape route. 74SOLAS(09 Cons) II-2/13.1.2

Embarkation station shall be adequately illuminated by lighting supplied from the emergency source of electrical power. Several over the side embarkation lights on the port side were found extinguished. 74SOLAS(09 Cons) III/22.4

Lifebuoy self igniting lights were within one month of expiration and five of which were found to be nonworking.

Vessel removed one lifeboat for maintenance. Reduced total persons on board capacity to 3000 persons to maintain the 75% of persons accomodated by lifeboats.

Spaces on passenger ships shall be maintained in accordance with the respective space category. The main machinery space is of such a space categorization that does not provide adequate fire protection against flammable liquids. Relocate flammable liquids and locker to an appropriately categorized space.

Lifeboat #11 removed from vessel due to the fwd hook's bracket and securing plate being torn from the fiberglass hull. Total number of passengers was reduced by 150, however, the lifeboat capacity should not fall below the required 75% for POB.

Rescue Boat #1 was found out of service, and lifeboat #1 is being used as rescue boat for stbd side.

the hydraulic accumilator, off the aft davit, was not in sync with the forward davit due to air in the lines. This prevented the safety hooks from releasing in sync which resulted in an unbalanced lifeboat, preventing recovery.

fire door A526 not properly closing.

Rescue boat SB side limit switch malfunctioning, vessel unable to recover vessel as required.

Train certified lifeboat commanders and assistant lifeboat commanders; re-quiz by CG Inspectors prior to departure

Make operable lifeboat davit #4. Until corrected, maximum passenger capacity is restricted to 2088.

Deck 10 port side aft replace insulation on vent trunk inside generator space.

Install STBD side vista stage B-15 door to satisfaction of the flag state rep. This door has been removed, it is missing. LEGACY COMPONENT DESC: Openings - Doors

Provide proof of proper operation, fire locker door #A-06-03, satisfaction of the flag state rep.

Replace handle to FSD#H03-06-11 to satisfaction of the flag state rep. LEGACY COMPONENT DESC: Accommodation Space Protection

Remove all combustible materials behind stairway #2. Near stage area in Vista lounge.

Provide class acceptance and approval of new installation of bowsing gear by 04 December 03. Provide report to MSO Miami. LEGACY COMPONENT DESC: Release Mechanism

Inspect fire hose lockers for hose kinks repair as needed. LEGACY COMPONENT DESC: Condition

Prove proper installation of ventilation and provide method to prevent waqter/weather intrusion onto main emergency switchboard in emergency generator sp[ace. Repairs are to be completed to satisfaction of class surveyor and attending Coast Guard Marine Inspector. LEGACY COMPONENT DESC: Panelboard

Prove proper operation and ability to charge fiore hoses at interior fire hose stations. List of stations in vessel file MSO Miami. LEGACY COMPONENT DESC: Location/Position

Complete outfitting of all lifeboats with required equipment.

Complete alterations to raft deflector system to allow launching of all rafts in way of forward life raft stations. Hand launched rafts could not be moved into position for davit. LEGACY COMPONENT DESC: Release Mechanism