MAERSK SENTOSA

Whenever a vessel is deprived of the service of a member of its complement, and the master or person in charge is unable to find appropriate credentialed personnel to man the vessel MAERSK SENTOSA a report of sailing short must be filed with the OCMI having cognizance for inspection in the area in which the vessel is operating, or the OCMI within whose jurisdiction the voyage is completed. Vessel master/rep made sailing short notification for the position of able bodied seaman from Newark NJ, to Charleston, SC. 46 CFR 15.725

A life jacket complying with the requirements of paragraph 2.2.1 or 2.2.2 of the Code shall be provided for every person on board the ship. MI's observed 23 life jackets at that Port and STBD side lifeboat muster stations that were not SOLAS or 46 CFR 160.155 approved. Vessel shall rectify prior to sailing on an international voyage.

Before the ship leaves port and at all times during the voyage, all life-saving appliances shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. During lowering of life boat evolution, MI's observed dead man brake lever for the port lifeboat failed to release and engage brake when crew member released pressure dead man brake lever.

The machinery, boilers and other pressure vessels, associated piping systems and fittings shall be of a design and construction adequate for the service for which they are intended. MI's discovered steam piping leak in port generator compartment and leak in boilers upper sight glass level valve.

Except as provided by § 15.725 of this part, no vessel may be navigated unless it has in its service and on-board the crew complement required by the COI. Prior to the vessel sailing on a international voyage proof must be provide, to the local Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection,(OCMI), that the vessel is fully manned in accordance with the Certificate of Inspection.

The purpose of this regulation is to contain a fire in the space of origin. For this purpose, the following functional requirements shall be met: thermal insulation of boundaries shall have due regard to the risk of fire of the space and adjacent spaces. MI identified missing insulation in lower level E/R port side where recent ballast water tank repair was made. Make repairs in accordance with applicable regulations to ensure proper fire protection is maintained in the space.

An International Oil Pollution Certificate shall be issued to any other ships of 400 gross tonnage and above which are engaged in voyages to ports or offshore terminals under the jurisdiction of other Parties to the present Convention. MI noted that the approval date for the SOPEP did not match the current approval letter. Lloyd's Register surveyor corrected the discrepancy and issued an updated IOPP Certificate.

The revised NOX Technical Code 2008 shall be applied in the certification, testing, and measurement procedures for the standards set forth in this regulation. MI identified the serial number on the Main Engine #1 EIAPP Certificate did not match with the Engine's NOX technical file. Lloyd's Register surveyor corrected the discrepancy and issued an updated EIAPP Certificate.

The 10-81 Gap Evaluation for MSP transfer to U.S. Registry of MAERSK SENTOSA (and MAERSK SELETAR) Prepared for Maersk Line Ltd by CG International dated March 2017 (Rev. 1) identified the following would be completed prior to the vessel’s next scheduled drydock (see page 19 of the Gap Evaluation): Prior to or during the next drydocking the following item will be installed to meet the requirements of 46 CFR 62 for Periodically Unattended Machinery Space: The approved LR Test Procedure for maintaining the EO class endorsement will be reformatted and submitted to the Marine Safety Center to meet the requirements contained in 46 CFR 61.40-1 and 46 CFR 61.40-6.2. USCG Marine Inspectors called to attend drydock for credit on 02 APR 2022. The above item was not completed. Vessel to provide proof of submission to USCG Marine Safety Center or Lloyd’s Register (LR ACP Supplement and MSC MTN 04-03) as specified in NVIC 01-13 CH-1 to attending marine inspector within 30 days. Cite: NVIC 1-13 CH-1 and Gap Evaluation for MAERSK SENTOSA dated Mar 2017

The 10-81 Gap Evaluation for MSP transfer to U.S. Registry of MAERSK SENTOSA (and MAERSK SELETAR) Prepared for Maersk Line Ltd by CG International dated March 2017(Rev. 1) identified the following would be completed prior to the vessel’s next scheduled drydock (see page 19 of the Gap Evaluation): • The existing engine room bilge pump will be fitted with controls for automatic start and stop operation activated by a level float switch in the forward engine room bilge well. The pump is not fitted with an excess run alarm as required by 46 CFR 62.35-50 but will be so fitted. • Remote control of the engine room watertight sliding door will be installed in the ECR. USCG Marine Inspectors called to attend drydock for credit on 02 APR 2022. The above items were not completed. Vessel to provide proof of completion for these items to attending marine inspector within 30 days. Cite: NVIC 1-13 CH-1 and Gap Evaluation for MAERSK SENTOSA dated Mar 2017

The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the Company. In accordance with the Gap Evaluation submitted to USCG by Maersk Lines Ltd for the MSP transfer of MAERSK SENTOSA to U.S. registry, items were identified to be installed and/or completed by the next scheduled drydock for the Periodically Unattended Machinery Space operations. The vessel had 5 years to effect these procedures/repairs but remain outstanding.

The condition of the ship and its equipment will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board. Observed soft patch and leak on the #2 SSDG spinner lube oil filter piping. 74SOLAS(14)I/11(a)

The condition of the ship and its equipment will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board. Observed wasteage on the starboard side B deck in the vicinity of the lifeboat launching area, the port side railing in the vicinity of the lifeboat launching area on B deck, and the second longitudinal in board of the starboard side on the B deck aft mooring station. 74SOLAS(14)I/11(a)

The condition of the ship and its equipment will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons on board. Vessel had extinguished emergency lighting on the starboard side embarkation in the vicinity of the lifeboat and the upper deck adjacent to bay 63. 74SOLAS(14)I/11(a)

Maintenance of condition after survey. Found in proper mechanical plug being used on port side A deck fuel oil containment.

All-lifesaving appliances shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. Able Seaman immersion suit does not fit.

Maintenance of condition after survey. Found two improper fire extinguisher brackets being used in engine room and steering gear room.

Maintenance of condition after survey. Found port side A deck door dogs taped and loose.

Maintenance of condition after survey. Found emergency lighting on the port and starboard life boat embarkation stations extinguished. Crew corrected on the spot.

All life-saving appliances shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. Port side embarkation ladder attachment D ring is wasted.

Maintenance of condition after survey. Found two fire detectors in engine room being held in place with tape.

Before the ship leaves port and at all times during the voyage, all life saving appliances shall be in working order and ready for immediate use. Additionally maintenance, testing and inspections of life-saving appliances shall be carried out in a a manner having due regard to ensuring reliability of such appliances. The Port and Starboard forward life raft embarkation ladders were found to be installed too close to the movable gate rendering them unable to be put over the side. Additionally, the port and stbd emergency embarkation lighting stanchion was found seized in place and unable to be swung over the side of the ship as well as the stowage bracket for the emergency embarkation light in the forward Bosun locker was found seized in place rendering the crew-member unable to properly deploy the light to the embarkation station. In addition six life-jackets were found un-serviceable in the vicinity of the port and stbd embarkation stations. Vessel shall correct the above deficiency to the satisfaction of the RO prior to departure from port.

Doors provided to ensure the watertight integrity of internal openings which are used while at sea are to be sliding watertight doors capable of being remotely closed from the bridge. The sliding watertight door located in way of the engine room and shaft alley was found to have a broken shaft coupling rendering it unable to be remotely opened from the bridge. Vessel shall submit a risk assessment and a plan on how they plan to mitigate this hazard along with a repair proposal to the satisfaction of the RO prior to departing the port.

The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company, in meeting these requirements, the company should ensure that: inspections are held at appropriate intervals. When asked for the LifeSaving inspection intervals for the apparatus at the forward port and stbd abandon embarkation stations out of the vessels Safety Management System (Lloyds Shipmanager), vessel crew were unable to provide it. They did however provide a periodic maintenance item for the ships embarkation ladders that stated they were to be deployed over the side of the ship or laid out along the deck and inspected. This maintenance item had not been completed and was overdue at the time of the inspection. They could not provide any more documentation to the testing or maintenance procedures or requirements for the forward lifejackets, emergency embarkation station, or the emergency embarkation light.

The company should establish procedures for the implementation of corrective action, including measures to prevent recurrence. When inspectors inquired through the whether class or flag had been notified of the failed control mechanism, they were told the port engineer stated he forgot to make notification. Maersk Document ID: 10-01-01 dated 03JAN20 states that if any critical equipment becomes defective and requires unplanned maintenance the master shall report to the relevant authorities in accordance with SMS procedures: Reporting of Statutory defects(Doc ID: 09-04-01.900) and Port State Control and Flag State control (Doc ID: 05-111.900). No notification was made to Flag State or to the RO.

The company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional requirements which may be established by the company, in meeting these requirements, the company should ensure that: records of these activities are maintained. Multiple Lockout-TagOut tags were identified during the course of the inspection that were either completely void of the information or missing significant portions of information required by Maersk Line, Limited Lockout-Tagout procedures contained in document ID: 07-01-02-01.900, more specifically the section labeled, Tagout Devices, must meet the following specifications: 3. Have a clearly visible, unique identifier, 4. Identify the date and individual who applied the tag. Further, a tag was found attached to motor controller breaker with a nylon cable tie. Maersk Line procedures specifically state that nylon cable ties are not an acceptable Lockout Device. Records reviewed during the inspection showed that the Chief Engineer completed an Audit of the Lockout-Tagout log on August 6, 2020, however according to the Lockout-Tagout log the deficient tags had been in place prior to the audit with no findings.

As delineated in deficiencies 1-5, Objective evidence attests to the vessel’s crew failing to effectively implement basic SMS procedures related to reporting deficient critical equipment, adhering to on board lifesaving maintenance schedules, and procedures related to safe working practices and procedures as it relates to Lockout-Tagout. The failure of the implementation of the SMS poses a significant risk to the safety of the crew. An Additional Internal verification of the vessels SMS focusing on the above items is required within 30 days in accordance with CVC-WI-003(2), USCG Oversight of Safety Management Systems on U.S. Flag Vessels.

Satisfactory means shall be provided for the protection of the crew in the necessary work of the ship. During the course of the inspection several transverse catwalks between cargo holds on the main deck were found corroded and wasted rendering them unsafe to walk on. This was persistent throughout the vessel forward of the accommodations.

Maintenance, testing, and inspections shall be carried out based on the guidelines developed by the organization and shall include at least the following fire protection systems: ventilation systems, including fire and smoke dampers and their controls. Multiple raised trunk C02 protected cargo hold ventilators were found severely wasted, holed, and corroded. In addition, several of these ventilators were found to be unable to properly seal when operated.

The construction and the means for securing the weather tightness of cargo and other hatchways in positions 1 and 2 shall be at least equivalent to the requirements of regulations 15 and 16 of this annex. Multiple weather tight cargo hatch covers were found to be without dogs due to sever corrosion. This discrepancy was evident throughout the cargo deck forward of the accommodation. Further, the STBD access hatch to the fin stabilizer room was found misaligned and unable to maintain a watertight condition.

Electrical installations shall be such that the safety of the crew and ship from electrical hazards will be ensured. The 220V Ballast for Sodium Lamps electrical boxes located in the forward bosun hole were found to be subject to saltwater intrusion from above. This was causing the boxes and associated wiring to be exposed to salt water causing corrosion. Specifically Ballast for L10-8. These electrical enclosures have no ingress protection rating. Additionally inspectors discovered 01 conductors in way of aft end of bay 14 had appeared to be ground out and melted the outer core of the conductor exposing the inner wiring to salt water ingress.

The following fire protection systems shall be kept in good order so as to ensure their required performance if a fire occurs: fire detection and fire alarm systems. A smoke detector in the fwd bosun locker was found with broken bracket and hanging from the overhead by the wires.

Hoses specified in this chapter as “fire hoses” shall, together with any necessary fittings and tools, be kept ready for use in conspicuous positions near the water service hydrants or connections. Deck station 24 was missing a spanner wrench.

Maintenance, testing and inspections of life-saving appliances shall be carried out in a manner having due regard to ensuring reliability of such appliances. The port side life raft embarkation ladder connection point to the deck was found 50% wasted.

SOLAS (2014) II-2/9.1.3 - FIRE INTEGRITY OF THE DIVISION SHALL BE MAINTAINED AT OPENINGS AND PENETRATIONS. FIRE STOP MISSING ON BULKHEAD AND DECK CABLE RUNS IN ELECTRICAL SPACES ON E AND F DECK.

74 SOLAS (2014) II-2/14/2.1.1.1 - FIRE PROTECTION SYTEMS SHALL BE KEPT IN GOOD ORDER TO ENSURE REQUIRED PERFORMANCE IF (1) NO.3 HOLD HATCH COVER (CO2 PROTECTED SPACE) FOUND UNLOCKED, MISALIGNED AND MISSING THREE CLOSING DEVICES. (2) STAIR WELL FIRE DOORS ON E AND F DECK DID NOT LATCH. (3) FWD GOOSE NECK VENT COVER HINGE COMPLETELY WASTED.

74 SOLAS (2014) II-1/40.1.3 - ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS SHALL BE SUCH THAT THE SAFETY OF THE CREW AND SHIP FROM ELECTRICAL HAZARDS WILL BE INSURED. (1) STEP UP TRANSFORMER FOUND IN USE AND UNSECURED ON TOP OF ICE MACHINE. (2) SEVERED GROUND WIRES ON (M6) MOORING DRUM MOTOR, MECH EXH FOR NO.9 HOLD VENT, AND P-WAY FWD(S) EXT MV-17 VENT. (3) STEEL ELECTRICAL CONDUIT WASTED AND JAGGED COMPROMISING THE SAFETY OF THE ENCLOSED CABLES.

ICLL 1966 25.2 - SATISFACTORY MEANS SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE CREW IN THE NECESSARY WORK-OF THE SHIP. (1) SAFETY BAR MISSING. (2) GRATING SEVERELY WASTED ON PORT-SIDE MIDSHIP CATWALK. NO PERS CAN SAFELY TRANSIT.

Cargo ship survival craft embarkation arrangements shall be so designed that the lifeboats can be boarded and launched directly from the stowed position *The port lifeboat and starboard showed signs of wastage on the davit. The davit points that hold the pulleys for the cable to control launching from the inside the boats are very thin. 4 Areas total

Cables and wiring shall be installed and supported in such a manner as to avoid chafing or other damage. *In the Bosun locker, there was an extension cord hard wired to the ship.

Portside liferafts were damaged from heavy weather.

Rails aft of house were damaged during the fall of the stores crane.

Port lifeboat suffered damaged to hull during heavy weather event.

Side stiffener of port side accomodation ladder is damaged. Class issued a Short Term Safety Equipment Certificate for 15 days.

VDR malfunctioned due to water ingress on the main capsule. VDR is currently recording on a flash drive.

1. Gear has found to be broken in steering gear box at helm for starboard lifeboat. Therefore, preventing lifeboat manufacturer's original means to steer the vessel, relying solely on the emergency tiller. Prove proper operation of original steering system to the satisfaction of USCG and Class. Due date: prior to sailing foreign.

Vessel's starboard pilot embarkation ladder corroded and requires replacement

Vessel's port lifeboat engine has seized during routine testing. Replacement engine is procured with deliver on or about 07 NOV 2016 while in Savannah, GA. Prior to sailing foreign, the vessel must repair/replace the port lifeboat engine.

VESSEL TO COMPLETE REPAIRS TO VDR PRIOR TO DEPARTING FROM NEXT PORT (GERMANY). PROVIDE TECHNICIAN REPORT & CLASS REPORT TO USCG STATING VDR IS FULLY OPERATIONAL.

Vessel must provide EIAPP certificates as proof of emissions compliance once issued bt the EPA. MARPOL VI/13 MEPC. 177(58)

Vessel must provide at least 08 fire axes easily accessible and visible throughout the vessel.

1410-Propulsion main engine-The arrangements for the storage, distribution and utilization of oil used in pressure lubrication systems shall be such as to ensure the safety of the ship and persons on board. Lower main engine block seal between No. 6 and No. 7 main bearing is leaking. 74 SOLAS (04) II-2/4.2.3.1

1470-Insulation wetted through (oil)-The arrangement for the storage of flammable oils shall be such as to ensure the safety of the persons on board. Excessive fuel leak on No.1 and No. 2 fuel oil feed pumps in purifier room. Excessive fuel soaked lagging and fuel oil in containment rail unit of main engine. Excessive fuel soaked lagging in main engine fuel oil supply unit. 74 SOLAS(04) II-2/4.2.4

1499-Propulsion-The machinery, other pressure vessels, associated piping systems shall be installed to reduce danger to persons on board. Steam leak at No.1 fuel oil heater inlet valve in purifier room. 74 SOLAS (04) II-1/26.1