ALTAIR

During an inspection of the port lifeboat, found the search light battery was dead, and upon asking for a new battery and the 2 required spare bulbs, none were found, flares were relocated temporarily to the bridge and will be returned prior to departure, expanded and crew was not familiar that a lifeboat equipment inventory checklist was needed, looked into the vessel SMS (called Safety Quality Environmental) which referenced the lifeboat manufacture manual, inside was a general inventory equipment table, did not state the required number/amount of equipment needed. Chief Mate then stated the manufacturer verifies lifeboat equipment, approx 1 year ago, evident that #1, the crew has not conducted the monthly lifeboat equipment checks for both lifeboats as they should be, and #2, a checklist was never created since the new lifeboats were installed approx 1 year ago. This indicates missing gaps in the vessel's SMS implementation.

Fire station 22 “Y” gate valve on station frozen hard to open. This system of fire stations is on the vessels PMS schedule as a quarterly inspection and was last completed on 11Dec2018. The PMS includes detailed instructions on how to clean and service each valve. It is questionable if this station was missed or that it will corrode up after only a quarter of sitting idle. If it is the latter then the PMS Schedule needs to be changed to a monthly PMS Cycle.

On the forecastle deck, the fire/ventilation damper closures were deficient. Many of the closures had been PMS’d as evident of the fresh grease on fittings, but not all fittings were satisfactory. Dog wing nuts on them were frozen and could not be moved, broken dog bolts on the closures. In checking the PMS schedule for these damper closures, it was discovered that these type closures are not on a specific PMS category, internal fire dampers are but not the exterior ones. This PMS item will need to be added to their schedule.

On the upper deck FWD house, the life raft stations on both the port and stbd side of the vessel were examined and deficiencies were found. The removable stanchions on the outboard side of each raft, are not so removable. The FWD stanchion on each raft was frozen in place, rusted with no apparent PMS for maintain these pieces. The PMS schedule for the life rafts was examined and nowhere in the PMS is any mention of checking the stanchions that are removable for manual deployment of the rafts. This will have to be added even though the vessel rep. stated it should be common sense to check them.

Forecastle deck FWD of the FWD house centerline watertight door, which is also an egress route from the house was not working properly. The center top dog on the door took almost the full weight of a person on it to open the door. There is a PMS for these doors but not being followed for some reason. Attention to the PMS Quality needs to be stepped up.

Upon testing of the 3 sliding watertight doors, bridge watertight door panel/diagram lights not functioning and lights installed backwards, after corrections and then testing of all doors, panel satisfactory, issue was not identified before our inspection. Same issue found during previous CG inspection of Mar 2018.

Newly installed liferafts were not installed in a float free arrangement in that the painter lines were attached directly to the hull of the ship vice the weak link.

Several Life ring lanyards that attach the floating light were deteriorated and in need of replacement.

Several weatherdeck outlets were missing covers.

Firefighting air bottles stowed on shelf with necks lying across knife edge of shelf creating potential missle hazard.

Weatherdeck house to steering room did not create a watertight envelope, adjust to secure correctly.

Indicator lights on bridge for all watertight doors in E/R were out.

Several distribution panels had incorrect or missing labeling.

Forward superstructure workshop had dead end wiring that was not correctly capped.

noted several ventillation enclosures on weatherdeck did not secure correctly and/or did have appropriate nuts for closure.

Forward stair tower door did not close correctly.

X3 fire extinguishers where not properly secured, the brackets being damaged.

Most of the Engine Room gauges had not been calibrated since 2009.

Hatch to 'B' deck, hold #3 recently had spring replaced but needs adjustment to operate correctly.

Several fire boundary doors found with holdbacks in place. Remove all hold back on fire boundary doors.

Verify paint locker explosion proof lights/switches will operate as intended. Currently it appears that the gas release holes have been painted over.