WESTERDAM

74 SOLAS 01 II-2/34.6 16C 07120 Furniture in stairway enclosures shall be limited to seating. It shall be fixed, limited to six seats on each deck in each stairway enclosure, be of restricted fire risk. Deck 9 aft stairwell had seats that were not fixed, deck A had trash cans and security scanner in midship stairwell.

74 SOLAS 01 II-2/26.2.2 16C 07101 For determining the appropriate fire integrity standards to be applied to boundaries between adjacent spaces, such spaces are classified according to their fire risk as shown in categories (1) to (14) below. Where the contents and use of a space are such that there is a doubt as to its classification for the purpose of this regulation, it shall be treated as a space within the relevant category having the most stringent boundary requirements. The title of each category is intended to be typical rather than restrictive. The number in parentheses preceding each catgory refers to the applicable column or row in the tables. Deck 8 had items stored inside the technical space behind the false bulkhead.

74 SOLAS 20 II-2/9.4.1.1.5.1 16C 07105 Fire doors in main vertical zone bulkheads, galley boundaries and stairway enclosures shall be self-closing and be capable of closing with an angle of inclination of up to 3.5° opposing closure. Fire doors FSD-0A.1.119, FSD 09.5.30, FSD 0A.3.47, FSD 0C6.06 did not close or latch.

74 SOLAS 20 III/19.2.1 16AC 04110 Every crew member with assigned emergency duties shall be familiar with these duties before the voyage begins. Forward liferaft team demonstrated insufficient proficiency in the deployment of the liferaft. Assigned personnel were unable to execute deployment procedures without external assistance.

74 SOLAS 20 III/19.2.1 16AC 04110 Every crew member with assigned emergency duties shall be familiar with these duties before the voyage begins. Stairwell guides in aft passenger stairway were unfamiliar with location of communication equipment.

74 SOLAS 01 II-2/28.1.10 16C 07120 The means of escape, including stairways and exits, shall be marked by lighting or photoluminescent strip indicators placed not more than 300mm above the deck at all points of the escae route, including angles and intersections. The marking must enable passengers to identify the routes of escape and readily identify the escape exits. Additionally, escape route signs and fire equipment location markings shall be of photoluminescent material or marked by lighting. Backstage of the world theatere, low location lighting was obstructed by chairs.

74 SOLAS 01 II-2/28.1.5.3 16C 07120 Doorways and cooridors and intermediate landings included in the means of escape shall be sized the same manner as stairways. Shall not be less than 900mm in clear width, the minimum clear width shall be increased by 10mm for every one person provided for in excess of 90 persons. The escape route was obstructed by boxes, rendering the escape route less than 900mm in width.

74 SOLAS III/11.4 16C 11124 Muster and embarkation stations shall be adequately illuminated by lighting supplied from the emergency source of electrical power required by regulation II-2/42 or II-2/43. 02 embarkation lights, starboard side lifeboat number 1 were extinguished.

74 SOLAS 20 II-2/9.2.1.1.5.2 16C 07105 Fire doors in main vertical zone bulkheads, galley boundaries and stairway enclosures, the approximate time of closure for hinged fire doors shall be no more than 40s and no less than 10s from the beginning of their movement. Fore doors FSD 0A.1.117, FSD 03.2.78 closed in less than 10s.

74 SOLAS 01 II-2/28.1.2 50AC 07120 Above the bulkhead deck there shall be at least two means of escape from each main vertical zone or similarly restricted space or group of spaces at least one of which shall give access to a stairway forming a vertical escape. On deck 3 the Shop Manager office does not have two means of escape.

74 SOLAS 01 II-2/28.1.10 50BC 07120 The means of escape, including stairways and exits, shall be marked by lighting or photoluminescent strip indicators placed not more than 300mm above the deck at all points of the escae route, including angles and intersections. The marking must enable passengers to identify the routes of escape and readily identify the escape exits. Additionally, escape route signs and fire equipment location markings shall be of photoluminescent material or marked by lighting. In the casino, adjacent to the casino managers office, PSCO identified an exit routed marked by photoluminescent signage that remains obstructed by barricades.

The activation of any detector or manually operated point call shall initiate a visual, and audible signal at the control panel and indicating units. if the signals have not received attention within 2 minutes an audible alarm shall be automatically sounded throughout the crew accommodation and service spaces, control stations and machinery spaces of category A. PSCO observed manual call point 203 did not activate upon testing at the bridge or locally. PSCO observed manual call point tested satisfactory. 74SOLAS 01, II-2/13.1.4

The means of escape, including stairways and exits, shall be marked by lighting or photoluminescent strip indicators placed not more than 300 mm above the deck at all points of the escape route, including angles and intersections. The marking must enable passengers to identify the routes of escape and readily identify the escape exits. Additionally, escape route signs and fire equipment location markings shall be of photoluminescent material or marked by lighting. PSCO observed 40 m of low location lighting on A deck on I-95 near engine control room, 10 m of photoluminescent strip on A deck near aft provision area and 3 m of low location lighting on A deck near fwd break starboard side blocked by rubbish, parts and various crowd control equipment. 74 SOLAS 01 II-2/28.1.10 40c Def Code: 07120

The purpose of this regulation is to prevent the ignition of combustible materials or flammable liquids. For this purpose, the following functional requirements shall be met: the ignitability of combustible materials shall be restricted; PSCO observed secondary lint trap in main laundry had not been cleaned per cleaning schedule and presented a fire hazard. 74 SOLAS 01 II-2/4.1 10c Def Code: 07199

In the case of partially or totally enclosed lifeboats, retro-reflective materials should be placed on the bottom of lifeboats and rescue boats which are not self-righting in accordance with Resolution MSC.481(102). Nonself-righting lifeboats and tenders found without retrorelective tape on bottom. 74 SOLAS 20 III/34 LSA Code 1.2.2.7 50a

Doors and door frames in "B" class divisions and means of securing them shall provide a method pf closure which shall have resistance to fire equivalent to that of that of divisions. B15 doors on deck 9 in the service cooridor adjacent to LFD 09.2.60 are damaged and failed to meet B15 closing standards.

Low location lighting shall be placed at all points of the escape path. LLL is absent in stairwell 12 which forms a means of escape from the storekeepers office.

Within the perimeter of such atairway enclosures, only public restrooms, lockers of non-combustible material providing storage for safety equipment and open information counters are permitted. Genie lift was stored in fwd crew stairwell on deck 1.

Each emergency generating set arranged to be started automatically shall be equipped with starting devices approved by the Administration with a stored energy capability of at least 3 consecutive starts. A second source of energy shall be provided for an additional 3 starts within 30 mins. The pneumatic starter for secondary means of starting emergency generator failed mechanically during testing/inspection and could not be repaired to provide required means of starting.

Fire doors in main vertical zones bulkheads and stairway enclosures shall be capable of closing in no more than 40 seconds. Numerous fire screen doors throughout the vessel did not fully close, in addition sliding fire screen doors on deck #2 and #3 (galley area) did not fully close. All were adjusted on the spot and found to be satisfactory after re-testing.

The Administration shall periodically verify the proper functioning of the ship's Safety Management System. Review and update transfer procedures implementing administrative and/or engineering controls to prevent future discrepancies with waste management record keeping, to include: ORB, Sounding Logs, Transfer Receipts, and other related documentation.

Each ship shall carry onboard all SMS documentation relevant to that ship. Records of maintenance conducted under the SMS were falsified by a 2nd engineer. 74 SOLAS (14) IX/3.1 ISM 11.3

In the event of an emergency, accidental or other exceptional discharge of sewage or greywater, immediate notification of the discharge shall be made to the COTP. The vessel had an accidental discharge and failed to notify the COTP. - 33 CFR 159.315(d)

The condition of the ship and it's equipment shall be mainteaned to conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons onboard. The forward REF panel for the starboard azipod is inoperable.

2020 - Fire Drills - Every crew member with assigned emergency duties shall be familiar with these duties before the voyage begins. Galley and liferaft crewmembers were not familiar with their assigned duties and equipment. - 74 SOLAS (14) III/19.2.1, 95 STCW Chap VI/Reg VI/3 - 16c

0999 - Other (Safety in General) - The means of escape shall be marked at all points of the escape route. The aft crew stair from Deck B to Deck A does not have continuous marking of the means of escape. - 74 SOLAS (01) II-2/28.1.10 - 10c

0199 - Other (Certificate) - The vessel owner or operator must ensure that they maintain one English language copy oof the Vessel Response Plan and a copy of the Coast Guard approval letter onboard the vessel. The vessel does not have a copy of the VRP onboard. - 33 CFR 155.5030(g)(1) - 10c

74 SOLAS (2001) II-2/33.1: THE WINDOW LOCATED IN THERAPY ROOM 4 ON DECK 9 HAS A 24" CRACK.

74 SOLAS (2001) II-2/3.4.1: CABIN A117 ENTRY DOOR HAS A 15MM HOLE COMPRIMISING INTEGRITY.

74 SOLAS (2001) II-2/40.5: PA SPEAKER IN SALON OFFICE IS INOPERABLE.

74 SOLAS (2001) II-2/28.1.1.0: GALLEY LOCATED ON DECK 2, PRIMARY MEANS OF ESCAPE SIGNAGE IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH FCP.

74 SOLAS (2001) II-1/45.1.3: THERMAL DETECTOR IN MENS SAUNA HAS EXPOSED WIRING.

74 SOLAS (2014) III/10.5: CREW NOT FAMILIAR WITH TEMP ABANDON SHIP PROCEDURES SET IN PLACE FOR INOP TENDER.

74 SOLAS (2001) II-2/28.1: ROOM-IN-ROOM ARRANGEMENT IN THE MAITRE DE OFFICE, DECK 2, THAT DOES NOT PROVIDE IMMEDIATE AND CLEAR NOTIFICATION OF A FIRE IN THE SURROUNDING SPACE.

0730 - Fire fighting appliances shall be maintained ready for use. 04 fire fighting extinguishers in the engine room and 01 fire fighting extinguisher in the Lido deck pantry had inspection seals missing. 74SOLAS(14) CH.II-2/14.1

The condition of the ship and its equipment shall be maintained to conform with the provisions of the present regulations to ensure that the ship in all respects will remain fit to proceed to sea without danger to the ship or persons onboard. Vessel experienced fire caused by oil-soaked insulation following maintenance to blackout tank fuel supply valve (SOLAS 74(09) Ch1/11a).

#5 main engine of vessel propulsion failed due to unknown cause. Means shall be provided whereby normal operation of propulsion machinery can be sustained or restored. SOLAS 2009 Chp II-I Reg 26.3 40ac (next US port after sailing foreign and to satisfaction of RO/RSO and Coast Guard)

1400 - Propulsion & Aux. Machinery - Ships shall be maintained in compliance with the mechanical and electrical requirements of a classification society which is recognized by the Administration in accordance with the provisions of regulation XI-1/1. Inop no.1 Steering pump for the Port side Azipod, due to failed mechanical seal. 74SOLAS(04)II-1/3-1

Electrical power available shall be sufficient to supply all services essential for safety in an emergency 74 Solas (04) consolidated, chap II-1 reg 42.2. Vessels emergency batteries caught on fire and could not supply emergency power.

Electrical installations shall be such that the safety of passengers, crew and ship from electrical hazards will be ensured. Steam pipe behind dryer number 5 was found to be leaking above an electric motor.

Fire doors in galley boundaries shall be self-closing. Fire screen door number 02.1.80 did not close properly.

The vessel's #12 and #15 lifeboats collided with each other. No apparent damage to the #12, #15 lifeboat sustained damage to the port bow in the vicinity of the hull/superstructure joint.

Vessel removed one lifeboat for maintenance. Reduced total persons on board capacity to 3000 persons to maintain the 75% of persons accomodated by lifeboats.

The forward stbd weathertight door on deck six does not close properly, all openings on exposed weatherdeck must have an expeditions mean for closing. The hatch must be forced closed to operate properly. SOLAS 74 II-I/17.2

There is improper stowage of stage material outside the entrance to the Vista Lounge on deck 1, the space is not classified to stow this material. There is also improper stowage in the deck 2 dressing room by the culinary arts stage. There is also improper stowage of a ladder in the dressing room stowage on the port side. SOLAS 74 II-2/9.2.2.3.2

An emergency source of electrical power shall be provided onboard the ship. During the test of the E-GEN it was observed that the lube oil for the engine sump was contaminated by water. SOLAS 74 II-1/42.1.1

Fire screen door 0D.5.01, the hinge that automatically closes the door is stripped from the door. The conditions of the ship shall not change after the completed class survey. SOLAS 74 I/11 (B)

Starboard Azipod was found to have a minor oil leak. Vessel installed a pressure gauge on the unit and must present pressure test findings upon arrival to the Coast Guard Inspection office in Ketchikan. Vessel must conduct a dive survey in a port to be determined by Sector Juneau.

Tender has hole in the port side hull and cracks in the A-Frame of the propellar shaft. Port side propeller is damaged.

FSD 09.5.25 held open with block wood, FSD 06.5.06 indicate open in bridge main control with malfunctioning sensor locally, and FSD 02.5.08 indicate open in bridge control with slow closing & hangs to fully closed.

Main half doors emergency exits in the Main Dining room located aft found froze & very hard to open.

Discharge flange for sludge discharge connection on deck STBD side bunkering station left open without blank flange.

Hi-Fog cage valve control station located main hallway found blocked by a gangway.

Current arrangement of cage around high mist system pumps does not allow access to gauges and controls in event of an emergency.

Complete items listed on worklist issued April 2, 2004, Rev Final in Venice, Italy